Silence and speech are often defined in relation to each other. In much scholarship, the two are perceived as polar opposites; speech enjoys primacy in this dichotomy, with silence negatively perceived as a lack of speech. As a consequence of this binary thinking, scholars remain unable to study the full range of the meanings and uses of silence in human interactions or even to fully recognize its communicative power. Merleau-Ponty described language as a gesture, made possible by the fact that we are bodies in a physical world. Language does not envelop or clothe thought; ideas materialize as embodied language, whether spoken or written. If silence is, as I argue here, as like speech as it is different, perhaps silence, too, can be a gesture. Rather than simply a background for expressed thought, if we considered silence to be embodied, to be a mating of the phenomenal and existential bodies, how might that affect current misconceptions of silence and subsequent limitations on the study of communicative silences?

Kris Acheson, Silence as Gesture: Rethinking the Nature of Communicative Silences, Communication Theory, Volume 18, Issue 4, November 2008, Pages 535–555, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00333.x